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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from the district court's order denying Two Jim, Inc.'s (hereinafter "Two
Jinn") motion to set aside forfeiture and exonerate bond (hereinafter "Bond Motion").

B. General Course of Proceedings Relevant to Bond DN10-2533498
On December 1,2008, a complaint was filed against the Defendant, Brett Robert Bardsley
(hereinafter "Bardsley") charging him with committing the crimes doperating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol two or more times within ten years, false personation and driving
without privileges on or about November 29,2008. R. 7-10. The magistrate court initially set bail at
$10,000.00. R. 11. On December 2, 2008, Two Jinn, authorized agent for Danielson National
Insurance Company, posted a surety bond, Bond DN10-2533498, on behalf of Bardsley. R. 38.
On January 28,2009, an amended complaint was filed. R. 15-17.

011 March 23,2009, the

State filed a motion to revoke and increase bond alleging Bardsley was not complying with the
conditions of his bond. R. 24-25. On March 24,2009, Bond DN10-2533498 was ordered forfeited
by the court for Bardsley's failure to appear for the hearing on the motion to revoke bond and set
bond in the amount of $50,000.00. R. 26-27,39. A bench warrant was also issued this same date.
R. 3.
On August 11,2009, a letter was sent to Bardsley asking him to take action to get back before
the court before September 20,2009, the 180'~day after the order forfeiting the bond. R. 44-49. On
August 12,2009, aNoiice of Location was filed s i t h a copy of the In-Custody verification attached
providing the State with information regarding Bardsley's location and in-custody status with the
U.S. Marshall's service in California. R. 41-43.

On September 3,2009, the Federal Judge ordered the pretrial release of Bardsley. R. 85. On
September 4,2009, an Aladdin Bail Bond agent in the San Diego Office posted a $50,000 bond for
Bardsley. R. 86. The Bail Receipt indicates a September 14,2009, court date for his arraignment in
San Diego, California. R. 86. On September 13,2009, Two Jinn filed a motion and a memorandum
in support of its motion to set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bond ("Bond Motion"). R. 2849. A letter dated September 16, 2009 from the San Diego County District Attorney to the Ada
County Sheriffs Office indicates a fugitive complaint was issued on September 14,2009 based upon
a warrant of arrest issued by Ada County with an indication that Bardsley would be extradited. R.
81-82. Apparently extradition proceedings were initiated to return Bardsley to Idaho. R. 78-79.
On October 13, 2009, an authorized representative of Two Jinn arrested and surrendered
Bardsley to the Ada County Jail. R. 52. On October 15,2009, the Certificate of Surrender was filed
with the court as a supplement to the Boiid Motion. R. 50-52. Bardsley appeared before the court on
October 20,2009. R. 53-54. On October 30,2009, the State filed an objection to the Bond Motion.
R. 55-60. OnNovember 23,2009, the State filed a second objection to the Bond Motion. R. 63-86.
A hearing on the Bond Motion was held on November 24, 2009. R. 61-62 and Transcript. On
December 17,2009, the Memorandum Decision and Order ("Order") was entered denying the Bond
Motion. This appeal follows.
111. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the interests ofjustice did
not require exoneration of Bond DN10-2533498.

IV. ARGUMENT
In Idaho, forfeiture, relief from forfeiture and exoneration of bail are governed by statute,
Chapter 29, Title 19 of the Idaho Code and court rule, I.C.R. 46.' State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds,
144 Idaho 651,653,167 P.3d 788,790 (Ct. App. 2007). The district court concluded that the Bond
Motion filed after Chapter 29, Title 19 of the Idaho Code and I.C.R. 4 6 were repealed is controlled
by the provisions effective the date of forfeiture, which was prior to July 1,2009. The basis of the
Bond Motion is whether justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture since an automatic
exoneration is not applicable to the facts of this case under former LC. § 19-2927 or LC. 4 19-2922.
If it appears that justice does i ~ orequire
t
enforcement of the forfeiture, the court may direct that the
forfeiture be set aside, in whole or in part. I.C.R. 46(h)(1).'

I

In ruling upon this motion, the court

S.L. 2009, Ch. 90, 3 I, repealed the previous Chapter 29, Title 19 ofthe Idaho Code effective July 1,2009.
S.L. 2009, Ch. 90, $ 2 adopted a new Chapter 29, Title 19 to be cited as the "Idaho Bail Act."
On June 15,2009, the Idaho Supreme Court repealed I.C.R. 46 in its entirety and adopted a new Rule 46,
which became effective July 1,2009. Relief from forfeiture when justice does not require its enforcement is
now governed by I.C.R. 46(h). I.C.R. 46(h)(I) is as follows:
(h) Forfeiture and enforcement of bail bond. (1) The court which has forfeited bail, upon a
motion filed within one hundred eighty (180) days after an order of forfeiture, may direct that
the forfeiture be set aside, in whole or in part, upon such conditions as the court may impose,
if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement ofthe forfeiture. In ruling upon such
a motion, the court shall consider all relevant factors, which may include but not be limited to
the following:
(A) the willfulness of the defendant's violation of the obligation to appear;
(B) the participation of the person posti~lgbail in locating and apprehending the
defendant;
(C) the costs, inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the state as a result of the
defendant's violation of the obligation to appear;
(D) any intangible costs;
(E) the public's interest in insuring a defendant's appearance;
(F) any mitigating factors;
(G) whether the state exhibited ally actual interest in regaining custody of the defendant
through prompt efforts to extradite him;
(H) whether the bonding company has attempted to assist or persuade the defendant to
expedite his return to Idaho by exercising his rights under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, Idaho Code 9 19-5001 et seq. ;and
(I) the need to deter the defendant and others from future violations.

shall consider all relevant factors. Id. As relevant to this appeal, I.C.R. 46 in effect at the time of
forfeiture provided:
(e)(4) The court which has forfeited bail before remittance of the forfeiture may
direct that the forfeiture be set aside upon such conditions as the courl may impose, if
it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture. If the court
sets aside the forfeiture, it may, with the written consent of the person posting the
bail, reinstate the bail, or the court may exonerate the bail, or the court may recommit
the defendant to the custody of the sheriff and set new bail or may release the
defendant on his or her own recognizance. The court shall give written notice to the
person posting the undertaking of the action taken by the court.
The analysis of whether this bond should be exonerated pursuant to former 1.C.R 46(e)(4) or I.C. 5
19-2917 and I.C.R. 46(h)(l) is similar.
The person posting bail has the statutory authority to arrest a defendant at any time before the
bond is discharged or exonerated. Former I.C. § 19-2925 provided as follows:
For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the bail, at any time before they are
finally discharged, and at any place within the state, may themselves arrest him, or by
a written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, may empower any
person of suitable age and discretion to do so.
At the time Bardsley was arrested I.C.

5 19-2914 was in effect, which permits the arrest of a

defendant by the surety insurance company or its bail agent or authorized representative at any time
before the exoneration of bail. Bardsley was arrested by an authorized representative of the bonding
company before the bond was discharged or exonerated.
In reviewing a trial court's exercise of discretion, this Court considers whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Rupp, 123 Idaho 1, 3, 843 P.2d 151, 153 (1992); Quick Release Bail

Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792. The Order indicates that the district court perceived the
issue as one of discretion.

A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between the state on one side and an accused
and his or her surety on the other side, whereby the surety guarantees the appearance of an accused.

State v. Abvacadabva Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113,116,952 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ct.App.1998). The
extent of the surety's undertaking is determined by the bond agreement and is subject to the rules of
contract law and suretyship. Id.
This Court has identified several factors that a court should consider when deciding whether
to order forfeiture of a bond. State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50,54,910 P.2d 164,168 (Ct. App. 1994). In

Fry, this Court stated:
In deciding how much, if any, of the bond to forfeit, the court should also consider:
(1) the willfulness of the defendant's violation of bail conditions; (2)
. , the surety's
participation in locating and apprehending the defendant; (3) the costs,
inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the state as a result of the violation; (4)
. . anyintangible costs; (5);he
interesti n ensuring a defendant's appearance;and (6)
any mitigating factors.

Id. The Fry factors also apply to a court's decision to set aside forfeiture and exonerate bond. Quick
Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792. A court may also consider any other relevant
factors, including the state's demonstration of interest in regaining custody of the defendant through
prompt efforts to extradite him or her, any effort by the bonding company to assist or persuade the
defendant to return to Idaho, and the need to deter defendants from future violations. Id. These
factors are also now part of I.C.R. 46(h)(l).
A.

Willfulness of the Defendant's Violation of Bail Conditions.
It is not known why Bardsley failed to appear at his March 24,2009 hearing on the motion to

revoke his bond. The trial court concluded he willfully violated his conditions of bail. R. 93. There
is no evidence to dispute this finding. Iiowever, if Bardsley had appeared at the Bond Motion
hearing, anything he said could be used against him and this case is still pending before the court.

The forfeited bond is not a performance bond. The willfulness of Bardsley's violation of the
obligation to appear also cannot be disputed because anything he said could be used against him and
this case is still pending before the court, thus evidence on this issue did not occur.

B.

The Person Posting Bail Located Bardsley, Notified the State of His Location,
Attempted to Persuade Him to Expedite His Return to Idaho and Ultimately
Apprehended Him, Surrendering Him to the Ada County Jail.
The trial court concluded that Two Jinn did not find Bardsley because the federal authorities

had located him almost five months earlier. R. 93. Bardsley was in federal custody as of June 4,
2009. R. 40. The fact that Bardsley was in federal custody before being located by Two Jinn is
irrelevant because there is no evidence that the State knew of Bardsley's location prior to the Notice
of Location being filed by Two Jim. In addition, the federal arrest impeded Two Jinn's ability to
arrest and surrender Bardsley within 180 days. State v. Two Jinn, Docket No. 35772 (Ct. App.
March 4,2010). Therefore, the trial court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
The State was notified of Bardsley's location on August 11,2009. R. 41-43. Bardsley was
asked to take care of this matter pursuant to a letter dated August 11,2009. R. 44-49,
Bardsley was arrested and surrendered to the Ada County Jail on October 13, 2009 by a
representative of Two Jinn. R. 52. If the surrender had occurred within 180 days, then this bond
would be exonerated automatically pursuant to former I.C. 3 19-2927 or LC. $19-2913. However,
as discussed above, the person posting bail has the statutory authority to arrest a defendant at any
time before the bond is discharged or exonerated pursuant to the former I. C. § 19-2925 and I.C. 3
19-2914 ( in effect at the time of the arrest.) A surety has the authority to arrest a defendant when a
motion is pending because the order of forfeiture is not yet final. See I.C. § 19-0-2918(c) (in effect at
the time the Bond Motion was filed.) It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation
which will not render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,646,22 P.3d 116,121 (Ct. App.

2001). Constructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd result are disfavored. State v. Doe,
140 Idaho 271,275,92 P.3d 521,525 (2004); State v. Yageu, 139 Idaho 680,690,85 P.3d 656,666
(2004). Also see State v. Two Jinn, Docket No. 35772 (Ct. App. March 4,2010).
To ignore the fact that Two Jinn still had the authority to arrest and did arrest and surrender
Bardsley renders the former I. C. 9 19-2925 and I.C. 9 19-2914 anullity after 180 days, which is an
absurd result. Therefore, the trial court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
C.

Cost, Intangible Costs, Inconvenience and Prejudice to the State.
Only vague allegations of costs were made at the hearing. The State did not incur costs to

transport Bardsley. The extradition process appears to have been only iniliated about the time
Bardsley was released from federal custody. The State has provided no specifics and no supporting
evidence for the costs allegedly incurred. The State has no entitlement to a windfall where the
amount of the bail far exceeds the State's costs. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167
P.3d at 792 (citations omitted). Forfeiture of the bond in its entirety is a windfall to the state.

D.

Mitigating Factors.
The primary purpose of hail is not punitive but is intended to ensurk adefendant's presence in

court. QuickRelease Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792. The arrest and surrender of
Bardsley once again brought Bardsley before the court. Bardsley posted bond in California and
returned to Idaho from California. As such, the extradition proceeding initiated by the State would
not have been effective. Aladdin's Idaho office had no notice of Bardsley's release from federal
ciistody and the State's extradition proceedings. Bardsley returned to Idaho and was arrested and
surrendered, which is a mitigating factor. The district court's conclusion that Two Jinn failed to find
Bardsley before his federal arrest shortens the 180 day time period in which to locate a defendant,
which is an absurd result. Constructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd result are

disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho at 275,92 P.3d at 525; State v. Yager, 139 Idaho at 690,85 P.3d
at 666. Also see State v. Two Jinn, Docket No. 35772 (Ct. App. March 4,2010).
The public has an interest in insuring Bardsley's appearance to answer to the charges against
him. After his surrender to the Ada County Jail, Bardsley again posted bond and has been released
from jail. R. 4. He was arraigned on October 20,2009. Id. The ultimate disposition of the case is
also a factor for the court's consideration. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at
792. This case is still pending before the Court.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, the trial court failed to act within the outer boundaries of its
discretion, did not consiste~ltlyapply the relevant legal standards, and did not reach its decision by an
exercise of reason. Wherefore the order denying Two Jinn's Bond Motion represented an abuse of
discretion.
Two Jinn respectfully asks that this Court vacate the trial court's order denying Two Jinn's
Bond Motion and direct that an order exonerating the bond be entered.
Respectfully submitted this 231d day of April, 2010.
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Attorney for the Appellant
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